'A small band of the best and most determined is far more valuable than a large mass of camp followers.' Adolf Hitler in 1926
'First, there is loyalty, God be praised, we have never had a single case of treason in our ranks.'
'Every man who joins the SS must know, that at any moment, he may be mortally wounded.' Heinrich Himmler, speaking to SS generals at Poznan 4 October 1943
'Men like Steiner and later Eicke . . . These were the people I most identified with and we often discussed how we could organize a soldierly force, an army along very different lines who would be superbly trained in a new way'
One of the more frequent complaints levelled against the Waffen-SS is that its troops suffered unnecessarily high casualties in battle due to excess zeal, aggressiveness and poor leadership. Despite HIAG's ( German World War 2 veteran's organization founded in 1951 by former officers of the Waffen-SS) protestations to the contrary, in 1939-40 there was a considerable element of truth in these accusations. Thereafter, however, any undue casualties suffered by the Waffen-SS can simply be attributed to the fact that any elite group which is kept semi-permanently in the front line is bound to suffer them. Moreover, hitting the enemy hard and fast, as the Army's own Panzer commanders found, minimises casualties, rather than the other way round; and the Waffen- SS's leadership was so 'poor' that its units were in constant demand, particularly in Russia, to act as mobile fire brigades wherever the fighting was expected to be the most fierce. In fact, it almost seems in some instances as though the Army deliberately sacrificed Waffen-SS units rather than accept casualties amongst its own men. Statistics are, unfortunately, elusive. The Waffen-SS lost some 253,000 men killed or missing, presumed dead, during the course of the Second World War—just over a quarter of its eventual total strength. The Army lost approximately 3,280,000: over a third of its strength. Perhaps, then, the truth is rather the reverse of that usually stated and SS 'aggressiveness' in the long run actually saved lives.
Another factor which may have contributed to the heavy casualties in 1939 is the fact that Waffen-SS units had little independent freedom of action, but were split up amongst various Army formations to sink or swim. Deutschland, together with the recently formed SS artillery regiment and reconnaissance Sturmbann, was brigaded with the 7th and 8th Panzer Regiments in Kempf's battlegroup for the invasion of Poland and participated in the fierce fighting for Brest-Litovsk. Germania remained in reserve with the 14th Army but saw some fighting during the occupation of the Lemberg area. The Leibstandarte had a rough time of it, attached to the 17th Infantry Division in the south. Because it was a motorised formation, it was used for reconnaissance and mobile flank defence, and saw heavy fighting around Pabianice in particular. The Leibstandarte was then re-allocated to 4th Panzer Division and fought its way through Lodz to the outskirts of Warsaw, then back westwards to help in the first major German encirclement manoeuvre of the war, in the bend of the River Bzura. The campaign culminated for the SS in the capture of the fortress of Modlin, which guarded the northern approach to Warsaw itself. The more recently formed Der Führer Regiment did not take part in this campaign since it was still not fully trained. One Totenkopf Sturmbann, Götze, did, however, acting as a small-scale forerunner of the later Einsatzgruppen in the Danzig area.
------------------------------------
WAFFEN SS WERE NOT HARD-CORE NAZIS
The hundred thousand young men in Germany from 1935 and were no different from the youth of other countries who also faced conscription later on. Like their parents, most German youths saw Hitler as having pulled their country out of chaos and disrespect, they certainly felt patriotism, but this hardly labels them as fanatical Nazis, either then or later. The SS soldier imbued with hatred was a rarity, even during the war.
----------------------------
'First, there is loyalty, God be praised, we have never had a single case of treason in our ranks.'
'Every man who joins the SS must know, that at any moment, he may be mortally wounded.' Heinrich Himmler, speaking to SS generals at Poznan 4 October 1943
'Men like Steiner and later Eicke . . . These were the people I most identified with and we often discussed how we could organize a soldierly force, an army along very different lines who would be superbly trained in a new way'
Sepp Dietrich post-war
One of the more frequent complaints levelled against the Waffen-SS is that its troops suffered unnecessarily high casualties in battle due to excess zeal, aggressiveness and poor leadership. Despite HIAG's ( German World War 2 veteran's organization founded in 1951 by former officers of the Waffen-SS) protestations to the contrary, in 1939-40 there was a considerable element of truth in these accusations. Thereafter, however, any undue casualties suffered by the Waffen-SS can simply be attributed to the fact that any elite group which is kept semi-permanently in the front line is bound to suffer them. Moreover, hitting the enemy hard and fast, as the Army's own Panzer commanders found, minimises casualties, rather than the other way round; and the Waffen- SS's leadership was so 'poor' that its units were in constant demand, particularly in Russia, to act as mobile fire brigades wherever the fighting was expected to be the most fierce. In fact, it almost seems in some instances as though the Army deliberately sacrificed Waffen-SS units rather than accept casualties amongst its own men. Statistics are, unfortunately, elusive. The Waffen-SS lost some 253,000 men killed or missing, presumed dead, during the course of the Second World War—just over a quarter of its eventual total strength. The Army lost approximately 3,280,000: over a third of its strength. Perhaps, then, the truth is rather the reverse of that usually stated and SS 'aggressiveness' in the long run actually saved lives.
Another factor which may have contributed to the heavy casualties in 1939 is the fact that Waffen-SS units had little independent freedom of action, but were split up amongst various Army formations to sink or swim. Deutschland, together with the recently formed SS artillery regiment and reconnaissance Sturmbann, was brigaded with the 7th and 8th Panzer Regiments in Kempf's battlegroup for the invasion of Poland and participated in the fierce fighting for Brest-Litovsk. Germania remained in reserve with the 14th Army but saw some fighting during the occupation of the Lemberg area. The Leibstandarte had a rough time of it, attached to the 17th Infantry Division in the south. Because it was a motorised formation, it was used for reconnaissance and mobile flank defence, and saw heavy fighting around Pabianice in particular. The Leibstandarte was then re-allocated to 4th Panzer Division and fought its way through Lodz to the outskirts of Warsaw, then back westwards to help in the first major German encirclement manoeuvre of the war, in the bend of the River Bzura. The campaign culminated for the SS in the capture of the fortress of Modlin, which guarded the northern approach to Warsaw itself. The more recently formed Der Führer Regiment did not take part in this campaign since it was still not fully trained. One Totenkopf Sturmbann, Götze, did, however, acting as a small-scale forerunner of the later Einsatzgruppen in the Danzig area.
------------------------------------
WAFFEN SS WERE NOT HARD-CORE NAZIS
The hundred thousand young men in Germany from 1935 and were no different from the youth of other countries who also faced conscription later on. Like their parents, most German youths saw Hitler as having pulled their country out of chaos and disrespect, they certainly felt patriotism, but this hardly labels them as fanatical Nazis, either then or later. The SS soldier imbued with hatred was a rarity, even during the war.
----------------------------
